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Anthropology and diplomacy
Is another form of diplomacy possible? [introduction]
Emmanuel de Vienne and Chloé Nahum-Claudel
1 The diplomatic innovations introduced by
Donald  Trump,  Vladimir  Putin  or  Xi
Jinping have yet to prove their adequacy
in response to the major challenges facing
humanity in the twenty-first century. This
is  not  for  want  of  creativity,  however,
since many of the contemporary changes
being introduced into the realm of foreign
affairs  are  in  evidence  in  the  styles  of
these three men. Trump, more than any
other world leader, uses “digital diplomacy” to address himself directly to other heads
of state and to his electorate, thereby short-circuiting the traditionally hidden work of
foreign ministries. Putin seems to do without diplomacy altogether, marrying brutal
irony  and  an  increasing  recourse  to  force.  Xi  Jinping  proposes  a  doctrine  of
articulations (Eckman 2018; Zhao 2018) which, by multiplying bilateral partnerships in
the  service  of  an  ambitious  strategy  in  economic  and  foreign  policy—sometimes
referred  to  as  the  “new  silk  road”—bypasses  the  Westphalian  model  of  a  game  of
alliances. At the same time, by relying on soft power strategies (Confucius Institutes that
promote  Chinese  language  and  culture,  coupled  with  trenchant  efforts  to  gain
international respectability), China presents itself as the bridgehead of an alternative
diplomatic model to that espoused by Western powers. Furthermore, as the scales and
types  of  actors  engaged  in  diplomacy  multiply  to  include  towns,  regions,  public
opinion,  NGOs  and  transnational  companies,  Indigenous  peoples,  etc.,  and  as  non-
Western powers continue to emerge on the global stage, pronouncements about a crisis
of traditional diplomacy, and even “diplomats’ blues”, abound.1
2 In his interview in this issue, French diplomat YVES SAINT-GEOURS remarks that this crisis
is, in fact, merely that of a certain kind of diplomacy, namely of multilateralism and its
ambition that international relations should be governed by something more than self-
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interest and the balance of power. The spectacular decline of this model of diplomacy is
palpable  in  the  UN’s  struggle  to  influence  the  decisions  of  individual  nations.  By
contrast, power politics and the quest for influence—the most traditional diplomacy—is
faring well, notably in those countries—China, Turkey, Brazil—that have until recently
been spoken of as “emergent”.
3 The UN is regrettably proving moribund at precisely the moment when the idea of the
planet as a tripartite entity, i.e. territory, resource and moral community, has become
self-evident,  demanding of  humans  an  ever-greater  accord in  the  service  of  a  new
relationship  with  planetary  life.  Mass  extinction;  the  deconstruction  of  Cartesian
dualisms; the recognition of cosmological systems that reserve a place for plants and
animals beyond that of quasi-objects, have all allowed the social sciences to admit non-
humans into their fields of investigation and to defend their status as subjects. In this
vein, various authors have made cosmopolitical or diplomatic propositions in recent
years (Descola 2013 [2005]; Latour 2004b; Morizot 2016; Stengers 2007), stressing either
the inter-human or inter-species dimensions of an expanded political sphere.
4 This issue of Terrain offers neither a solution to our ecological crisis nor the key to
world peace. It simply takes our curious failure to agree to prevent the end of the world
as the sign that the anthropology of diplomacy still has work to do. Our theoretical
predilections  are  two-fold.  First,  we  wish  to  open up  the  spectrum of  comparison,
which requires that we adopt an inclusive working definition of diplomacy as the “art
of managing separations” (Badie 2016). In the canonical definition, diplomacy is the
peaceful  conduct  of  relations  between states  by  polite  representatives.2 Despite,  or
rather because of,  its  hegemonic character,  we take this  to be but one case among
others.  Our  second bias  is  towards  a  pragmatic  and interactionalist  approach.  This
implies that we consider diplomatic arts as social and linguistic realities and that we
are critical of the idealisms that have marked anthropological evocations of diplomacy,
both in the post-war period and in the recent work of Bruno Latour and others. It also
implies  that  we  insist  on  emergent  forms  of  diplomacy.  By  this  we  mean  that
diplomatic situations are by definition uncertain ones in which the situation itself, and
its stakes, are thrown into question. A focus on diplomacy as something that emerges
from  uncertain  situations  allows  us  to  see  it  in  the  making,  before  it  becomes
institutionalised or fixed, and to see communities constructed through the process of
representing themselves to the outside world.
5 This method will allow us to propose some hypotheses of a general character, founded
in part on the cases presented in this issue and in part on our own ethnographic work
in Central Brazil,  a place where a sort of tropical cosmopolitanism was constructed
historically, and continues to exist today. These hypotheses are that diplomacy always
entails modelling; that political representation is an inescapable aspect of it; that the
exercise of diplomacy, ritualised or not, implies mimicry or mirroring; and that in the
arts of diplomacy the vanquished are more inventive than their conquerors.
 
Homo diplomaticus?
6 Finnish diplomat Ragnar Numelin wrote Beginnings of Diplomacy: A Sociological Study of
Intertribal  and  International  Relations  in  1949.  The  book  had  an  idealistic  mission:  to
demonstrate that everywhere and in all  epochs,  it  has been human destiny to seek
peace:  “the green branch, is  a symbol more powerful and stronger than the sharp-
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pointed spear” (1950: 315). Numelin was writing when it was unclear if the fledgeling
UN would endure or collapse, as had been the case first with the Geneva Peace of 1919
and  then  with  European  diplomacy  in  1939.  By  assembling  data  about  “primitive
diplomacy”,  Numelin  sought  to  defend  a  naturalist  interpretation  of  diplomacy,
departing from the tendency to trace a restricted historical genealogy from ancient to
modern  European  states.  The  sending  of  envoys,  diplomatic immunity,  symbols  of
peace, neutrality in conflict, war emissaries, peace covenants and the right to asylum
are  all  discovered  in  the  ethnographic  record,  from  Aboriginal  Australia  to  North
America, to prove that “corresponding institutions” (1950: 169) exist in the civilized
and primitive world. By reviewing ubiquitous ethnographic observations of symbolic
acts such as the breaking of spears, the taking of oaths, sham fights, intermarriage,
animal sacrifice, blood brotherhood, compensation and exchange, as well as numerous
other forms of peaceful alliance-making, Numelin stresses the universal priority given
to “security” at the expense of war. War, when it breaks out, is not spontaneous or
lightly  undertaken,  but  “preceded  by  long  negotiations”  (1950:  179).  There  is  little
chance that this hefty volume of accumulated instances, cherry-picked and glossed by
an ideologically driven author, will convince anyone today, and we will not defend the
idea that humans have always and everywhere preferred to maintain peace and avoid
warfare.
7 To naturalise  diplomacy is  no  more  convincing  than to  affirm that  aggression and
mutual  destruction are  innate  tendencies  that  have everywhere to  be  regulated by
institutions functionally equivalent to Western law and justice. This was the tendency
that dominated anthropology when it detached itself from evolutionism. For example,
Bronislaw Malinowski (1985 [1933]) compared Melanesian conflict resolution methods
and responses to criminal behaviour to the judicial and legal institutions of Western
countries.  In  a  less  explicitly  functionalist  vein,  Meyer  Fortes  and  Edward  Evans-
Pritchard (1940) made a similar move by envisaging Tallensi or Nuer kinship as political
systems  in  the  full  sense  of  the  term.  In  both  cases,  the  aim  was  to  counter  the
evolutionist assumption that politico-legal institutions belonged only to states and to
show that “primitive” societies were not anarchical. For Marilyn Strathern, however,
such analogies are misleading in their own way. While they rehabilitate non-Western
politics, they do so only to confirm the Hobbesian ideology at the heart of Western
justice, which presents itself as “a societal mechanism which meets basic human needs
for regulation” (1985: 113), thus assuming that hostility will prevail in the absence of
regulation. For Strathern, it would be a mistake to read the dispute resolution practices
of  the inhabitants  of  Mount Hagen in Papua New Guinea as  “implementations of  a
separately  constituted  and  normative  social  order”  (1985:  129).  For  those  who
orchestrate them they are rather occasions to consolidate political power, just as they
may affirm it  through warfare.  In this  conception of  politics,  whether by means of
peace or war, what matters is to act and to force others to act. In the hour of “disaster
capitalism”, when no one is surprised when the world’s big men deliberately instigate
trade wars, precipitate constitutional crises or boast equally of a symbolic handshake
and the assassination of an enemy general, it will be difficult to convince anyone that
the normative order is one of the resolution and regulation of conflict in the service of
peace and stability. As so often occurs with anthropological challenges to a supposedly
“Western” cosmology, the mirror of alterity breaks down and British and American
politicking comes to resemble its Papua New Guinean homologues.
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8 To  return  to  Strathern’s  own  conclusion,  it  would  be  disappointing  if  by  drawing
attention  to  how  analogies  may  mislead  us,  we  foreclosed  the  possibility  that
anthropology might contribute to the understanding of the exercise of diplomacy in
general. In fact, the previous generation of anthropologists whom Strathern critiqued
for their excessive analogical fervour had been beacons of hope. The effort to pluralise
politics and think beyond the state had inaugurated a period in which the discipline
had played a role in opening up the political imaginary. As Heonik Kwon3 notes, this
culminated in the post-war period, when anthropologists like Margaret Mead, Claude
Lévi-Strauss and Alfred Métraux were the soul of UNESCO, creating an ideal of world
peace constructed on the basis of mutual understanding between peoples that would be
enabled by anthropological knowledge.
9 Sixty years later, the hope of the post-war period now feels very distant indeed and
anthropology and diplomacy need to produce new concepts and institutions to address
a new, darker, planetary horizon. Only the Anthropocene and the rapid establishment
of  the  climate  as  a  major  political  actor  allow the  spirit  of  the  UN occasionally  to
reignite. One UN Climate Change Conference after another shows nonetheless that this
spirit struggles to incarnate itself in a specific project. Is cosmopolitanism dead?
 
From cosmopolitanism to cosmopolitics
10 The modern notion of cosmopolitanism is defined in two famous essays by Kant, Idea for
a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View (1784) and Perpetual Peace (1795), in
which he draws the contours of a federation of republics which, unlike a monarchy,
would  foster  universal  harmony  rather  than  the  advancement  of  particularistic
interests.  As  citizens  of  the  world,  individuals  would be  the  subjects  of  rights  that
trumped customary rights or local laws. Joseph Thériault and Frédéric Dufour (2012)
note  the  extent  to  which  cosmopolitanism  is  based  simultaneously  upon  the
recognition of universal reason (which defines the individual as the subject of rights)
and human diversity,  whose previously  unsuspected amplitude was  revealed in  the
period between the Renaissance and the Enlightenment. This cosmopolitanism, which
lies behind the creation of first the League of Nations and then the United Nations,
rests thus upon a modernist constitution that while absolutely compatible with the way
Lévi-Strauss  articulated  nature  and  culture,  for  example,  is  much  less  so  with
anthropology as it has developed since the postmodern turn. Isabelle Stengers (2010
[1996]) and Bruno Latour (2002, 2007) have drawn out the consequences of this shift for
cosmopolitical  thought.  Latour  formulated  this  clearly  in  his  critique  of  the
cosmopolitan sociology of Ulrich Beck.
What he does not realize . . . is that whenever cosmopolitanism has been tried out,
from Alexandria  to  the United Nations,  it  has  been during the great  periods of
complete confidence in the ability of  reason and,  later,  science to know the  one
cosmos whose existence and solid certainty could then prop up all efforts to build
the world metropolis of which we are all too happy to be citizens. (Latour 2004b:
453)
11 If,  however,  disagreements  have  an  ontological  status,  then  taking  them  seriously
implies  that  we literally  do not  live  in  the same universe.  For  example,  to  retell  a
famous anecdote of Lévi-Strauss’s also discussed by Eduardo Viveiros de Castro (2004),
Amerindians and Westerners in the Renaissance had a profound disagreement about
what constituted a person. The former defined personhood by the body and left the
Anthropology and diplomacy
Terrain, 73 | 2020
4
Whites’  cadavers in the water to see if  they would rot;  while  the latter  debated at
Valladolid whether Indians had souls. What’s more, as Philippe Descola (2013 [2005])
has shown, within its conception of human morality the Amerindian world included
most of the animal kingdom, contrary to the naturalist contract that holds animals at a
distance, placing them within the sphere of Nature. Latour’s cosmos is thus closer to
William James’s pluriverse than to the world of Kant. It is in this encounter between
radical alterities, when we can no longer agree on the arbiter (Reason, Science, etc.),
that Latour situates war in the full sense of the term and thus the need for a new kind
of diplomacy. Where a common arbiter exists, we are faced instead with what he calls
“police operations”.
12 The anthropologists’ task—heroic but overwhelming—is thus, according to Latour, to
be the diplomats between these disjointed worlds, a task that can take two directions.
The  first  consists  of  self-critique.  In  order  to  reinstitute  confidence  in  Europeans’
capacity to construct a new world order, we must “recall modernity” (in same way that
a  defective  product  may  be  recalled)  by  studying  it  deeply  to  discover  its  failings
(Latour 2004a, 2013 [2012]). On the strength of this new, deeper self-knowledge, we will
be able to present ourselves to others anew—politely this time. The second task is to
help excluded worlds and entities repudiated in international relations because of their
evanescent, uncertain or premodern status (things like mountains, Indigenous people,
the atmosphere, etc.) to participate in negotiations. In May 2015, a few months before
the UN Climate Conference (COP21), Bruno Latour and Laurence Tubiana presented a
model of what such post-modern climate negotiations would look like at the Amandiers
Theatre in Nanterre. Two hundred students, from various countries, represented not
only states,  but  also collectives  that  normally  are censored or  have their  existence
denied.
13 Though  it  is  undeniably  a  step  towards  the  pluralisation  of  diplomacy,  Latour’s
proposition suffers, according to some (especially those inspired by the work of Pierre
Clastres),4 from failing to question norms of political representation. This is the critique
levelled by CHARLES STÉPANOFF in his contribution to this issue, following Morizot (2016).
Recalling the disarray caused by the determinately acephalous gilets jaunes movement
in  France,  he  defends  the  possibility  of  “living  without  diplomats”,  arguing  that
assuming the role of spokesperson is  a slippery slope to the arrogation of personal
privilege,  echoing  a  point  made  by  Bourdieu.  Stépanoff  compares  the  destines  of
different  Siberian  peoples  submitted  to  Russian  conquest  over  the  centuries.  This
comparative  endeavour  allows  him  to  establish that  the  role  of  the  diplomat  was
adopted easily in stratified societies. These were also societies in which shamanism was
diplomatic  in  nature,  with  the  shaman  representing  the  spirits  rather  than  acting
simply as their translator, and in which a “principle of substitution” existed also in
other  domains.  For  example,  in  these  societies  with  political  representation  it  was
possible to buy a spouse or to resolve a murder by means of compensation. Inversely, in
those societies  that  refused this  principle  of  substitution and turned their  back on
hierarchy—societies  in  which  a  murder  had  to  be  avenged  and  a  marriage
consummated by a period of service rendered by the groom to his new wife’s family—
Russians struggled in vain to establish their hold over people because they failed in
their habitual method of forcing their hostages to become diplomatic intermediaries
between their own societies and their Russian vanquishers.
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Gaia in your body
14 If Stépanoff implicitly sees in diplomacy a symptom of the state, BAPTISTE MORIZOT seeks
rather to renew the concept while removing it from the context of human political
relations in favour of relations between species. Interested in the return of wolves in
the  Pyrenees  (Morizot  2016,  2017),  he  advocates  for  a  renewed  appreciation  of
cohabitation, anchored in the evolutionary history of living things, in which shared
territories,  the  reading  of  all  kinds  of  indices,  and  mutualistic  adaptation  are  all
diplomatic practices that we share with other species, but from which humans have
become  estranged.  A  diplomacy  without  representatives  is  thus  possible,  and  rests
upon a profound reformulation of our relationship to the world, one in which we would
no longer ignore the interconnections between beings,  but  rather in which we pay
attention to signs of non-human presence and those who make them. In sum, Morizot
is calling for a geopolitics that is coupled with “cosmopoliteness”. In his contribution,
he deals with conflicts that arise when wolves predate upon herds of sheep. He opts to
refuse the mantle of representing one side or the other and argues for the virtues of
neutrality, lived as moral ambivalence. Neither God nor master, or, rather, neither wolf
nor sheep (nor shepherd), the diplomat that he becomes, and invites others to become,
represents “interdependencies” composed of the system of conflictual relations among
coexisting  collectives.  He  counts  himself  part  of  a  movement  that  includes  Yoann
Moreau and Nastassja Martin, who share this same proposition for a return to the self
as the basis on which to construct a new way of living in the world—an internal and
individual  reform to  confront  “what’s  coming”  (Martin  2019).  In  response  to  near-
death at the hands of a bear (an initiatory encounter), Martin makes of her narrative of
renaissance a plea for “alertness” (le qui-vive)—for adaptation, movement and the art of
listening—borrowed from Arctic animist societies among whom she has worked. In a
rather  more  pastoral  register,  Yoann  Moreau  (2019),  during  a  lakeside  walk
accompanying riberinhos5 in the Brazilian state of Para, observes that killing insects that
land on his skin provokes anger among his hosts. His body is presented to him as an
embassy, open to the beings who treat it as a territory and place of encounter. This is a
“diplomatic body”. According to this conception, the singularity of the “I” shelters a
pluriverse so that the macropolitics of the world becomes a micropolitics of the subject.
Is this a new animism? Or, rather, finding in the individual body a refraction of the
cosmos—a diplomatic arena, a land of asylum, a territory to be defended—is it a return
to analogism? It seems unlikely that this conception of diplomacy offers an escape from
representation.  It  is  simply  representation  squared,  by  decree,  authoritarian  but
permitted because it applies only to the self; a self that is the whole world. In the place
of a representative of each party, there is an individual that represents the whole … but
at what risk of dissolution?
15 While we can only approve of this call  to transform our relationship to life,  in this
celebration  of  interiority  it  is  difficult  not  to  see  a  mere  intensification  of
contemporary Western logics of self-making, based on experiences of rebirth and self-
transformation. How would this translate into human politics? Self-reform is so easily
incorporated into the sphere of personal development that is entirely compatible with
capitalist logics (Cabanas & Illouz 2019 [2018]). At the same time, it is compatible with
the  propositions  of  Chinese  diplomacy,  which  has  no  quibble  with  political
representation and indeed attempts  to  fold  a  billion subjects  into the person of  Xi
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Jinping. And Taoism, a philosophy of scalar correspondences, is an important element
of Chinese soft power ...
 
The act of diplomacy
16 Leaning  on  philosophically  inclined  anthropological  work,  Latour  hardens  the
heterogeneity of worlds which, in this new non-modern constitution, are no longer
called cultures, but ontologies. Based on the recognition that “others” are not blind
adherents to false and irrational “beliefs”, but rather the fully fledged subjects of their
own world, the ontological turn6 presents itself as the sole means of “decolonising”
anthropological thought. Although politically seductive (and indeed extremely popular
among  social  science  students),  the  conclusion  is  too  hastily  drawn,  ignoring  the
inconvenient fact that “worlds” are constructed on the basis of ethnographic research
entailing  interactions  that  have  necessarily  overcome  obstacles  of  disjuncture  and
equivocation.  Indeed,  a  consideration  of  the  primary  tools  of  ethnographic  work,
language and translation,  is  glaringly  absent  from the ontological  turn.  Ontological
incommensurability, in order to be narrated and thus brought into being, relies on the
capacity for communication. In our view, within interaction there is a universal basis
or horizon for the construction of sense in the absence of a pre-existing shared code.
This  is  a  capacity  that  is  not  unique to  humans.  This  classic  universalist  argument
remains valid even if we recognise that translatability is eternally incomplete. In the
famous  thought-experiment  of  Gavagai,7 Willard  van  Orman  Quine  showed  that
reference  is  in  the  last  instance  indeterminable,  just  as  the  mind  of  the  other  is
logically inscrutable. Even in more realistic situations, translation and communication
are a long way from being simple or mechanical exercises. Far from defending the idea
of a universal language present throughout eternity, we insist on the fact that humans
systematically  exert  themselves  to  translate.  It  is  this effort  to  translate  that  is
universal.  The  kinds  of  questioning  to  which  translation  gives  rise  furnish
anthropology  with  a  fruitful  epistemological  principle  (Hanks &  Severi  2014).  We
propose  thus  to  take  as  our  point  of  departure  the  existence  of  inter-linguistic
communication,  even  if  it  is  equivocal,  uncertain  and  generative  of  unintentional
misunderstandings,  rather  than  starting  with  the  encounter  of  frozen  systems
constructed  as  structural  inversions  of  one  another  (naturalism  and  animism,
multinaturalism and multiculturalism, etc.). A strategy that takes worlds rather than
translation as its point of departure tears the ontological fabric—which is ever in the
process of being co-constructed by actors themselves—only to ask where the needle
and thread have gone.
17 Such an interactionist and linguistic bias is common to several articles in this issue.
Diplomacy is envisaged as a practical exercise of coming to agreement, or of partial
commensuration  among  opposed,  or  simply  different,  points  of  view.  This  recalls
Frederick Barth’s rethinking of ethnicity from the boundary or periphery as opposed to
the  centre.  We  prefer  thus  to  return  to  the  ways  that  zones  of  agreement  or
disagreement are constructed. Humans—and non-humans as well—appear to be gifted
at  this:  it’s  what  they  do  (even  when  they  do  it  badly)  more  often  than  they  do
metaphysics  (either  well  or  badly).  Linguistic  anthropology  has  proved  to  be  an
effective remedy for relativist excesses. Approaching diplomacy as interaction is not to
say  that  humans  are  pacifists  by  nature,  after  Numelin,  but  to  suggest  that  when
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societies  decide,  momentarily  or  long-term,  to  establish  peaceful  relations  without
thereby identifying themselves with another (a minimal definition of diplomacy), they
encounter perhaps everywhere the same constraints  and invent similar,  or  at  least
comparable, solutions. We can therefore identify some recurrent aspects of diplomacy.
 
Metaviolence
18 According  to  the  common-sense  definition  and  as  it  is  practised  by  professionals,
diplomacy entails polite interactions that hold violence at bay. However, many non-
European diplomats  have preferred,  with rituals  of  feigned warfare or  opposition—
sporting  contests,  duals,  feigned  aggressions  and  simulated  invasions—to  flirt with
violence rather than to exclude it. These forms of interaction share a framing of action
close to  what  Gregory Bateson (1972)  defined as  “play” and applied first  to  animal
behaviour. In such a framing, participants assume two levels: a communicative level
(the sign that points to aggression) and a metacommunicative one (a sign that the sign
of aggression is feigned). Doing diplomacy often implies raising weapons in order to
lower them, faking an exchange of blows, exchanging blows for real, but according to
rules that attenuate their danger, or doing so just once. In contrast to play, however,
diplomatic  situations  are  constitutively  uncertain.  The  signs  of  peaceful  or  playful
intent are fragile, easily dissolved or suspected of masking hostile intent.
19 In the Upper Xingu, a multi-ethnic society in Brazil, alongside the wrestling matches
that mark ritualised encounters between villages, there is a ritual we can qualify as
diplomatic, the Javari. Men of each village, plumed and painted to identify themselves
with dangerous animals like the jaguar or the harpy eagle, confront one another in the
central arena. The festival’s unfolding stages a gradual approximation between the two
sides that is simultaneously a gradual increase of aggression. Following multiple stages
of ceremonial greeting, and dances in which each side keeps to itself, adversaries on
each side take possession of the grotesque human effigy that is installed in the arena.
The participants take turns to injure and shoot it, calling the name of a cross-cousin
(and thus a potential spouse-giver) in the adversarial group as they do so. Finally, at the
climax of the ritual, the adversaries confront one another by throwing darts at close
range. At every Javari at a certain point the situation threatens to degenerate, breaking
free  of  the  diplomatic  framing.  This  is  the  moment  when  the  ritual’s  chiefs  and
messengers intervene to calm the passions and signal the end of the contest. These are
the figures who are most obviously akin to diplomats because of their role as village
representatives as well as their careful ethos. After this, the champions of each group,
who are made up as falcons and were the first to confront one another in the initial
context, resume the duel, but this time in a trivial way: each in turn touches the other’s
thigh delicately with the point of their spear in a vivid image of the remoteness of
violence  but  one  that  maintains  their  antagonistic  mutual  positioning.  In  the  final
stage, the two sides exchange dance partners—a clear symbol of the reversibility of
warfare and alliance—before sharing in a meal of manioc bread and fish. The hosts
thereby  compensate  with  food  for  the  blows  they  have  inflicted  on  their  invited
adversaries.
20 This example, in which hostility and violence are recognised and even exercised as a
prerequisite for increasing closeness, is typical of Amazonian diplomacy in general. In
an article treating “foreign affairs” in primitive societies, Lévi-Strauss (1949) noted that
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the  Brazilian  Nambikwara  had  nothing  resembling  European  total  warfare  nor  its
opposite,  an  ideal  of  universal  peace.  By  contrast,  their  institutions  enabled  fine
gradations between enmity and alliance, and their rituals seemed to be conceived not
to suppress conflicts and antagonisms but to express and channel them. Trio (Rivière
1971) and Yanomami (Kelly Luciani 2017) ceremonial dialogues are two among many
possible examples of a poetic embrace of hostility that allows it to be subsequently held
at bay, and both demonstrate also the prominent place of affinal relations and their
attendant ambivalences in Amerindian sociality.
21 As a matter of fact, diplomatic processes that seek to hide violence and conflict under a
bushel have their limitations. GWEN BURNYEAT’s contribution sheds light on the limits of
conventional diplomacy, founded on politeness, based on the efforts of the Colombian
government to convince its citizens of the benefits of “peace pedagogy” in the context
of FARC demobilisation. We follow Filimon, an ageing peasant who lost his son to the
conflict, as he listens to a young, idealistic and groomed bureaucrat from the capital
preach the virtues of peace: “What can she possibly know about war?” he asks himself.
And indeed, the anthropologist describes the fatal flaws of peace pedagogy and the
ascent once again of martial politics with the election of Duque in 2018.
22 Nonetheless,  a  courtly ethos remains the mark of  official,  state diplomacy.  As Yves
Saint-Geours explains in his interview, an aristocratic attitude of control and restraint
provides the ideal model of how states should behave towards one another. It can also
be understood as a mask placed upon the reality of antagonism. As such, in certain
cases, politeness can be a way of stressing, euphemistically, an underlying reality of
hostility and violence. Nonetheless, diplomatic speech is opposed to ordinary speech
insofar  as  it  explicitly  forbids  violence.  By  means  of  its  exclusion,  violence  is  thus
accorded a  definitive  role.  Rather  than setting up a  dichotomy between polite  and
violent diplomacies, then, we propose that all diplomacy implies a reflexive attitude
towards violence: repudiating it, simulating it, exercising it a single time, or striving for
its control and sometimes failing.
 
Diplomatic ritual as modelling
23 “By calmly dusting off  Macron’s  suit  jacket,  Trump immediately  showed the whole
world who was Daddy,” reported Sylvain Prudhomme in May 2019, after the French
president’s visit to the United States.8 In this example political representation takes the
form of a visual sign that represents, in miniature, a collectivized relationship. This is
what we mean by modelling. In diplomatic situations gigantic entities find themselves
replicated in small places, by small things, or singular individuals. The most ubiquitous
resources of social interaction, even gestures and body postures, become pertinent for
the destiny of the peoples represented. Every encounter is thus a leap in scale to what
we might call the meta-political. This invites self-reflexivity and, with it, exertions or
strenuous  efforts,  adjustments,  and  tinkering  on  a  micro  scale  with  the  aim  of
manipulating  the  macro  scale  that  is,  by  these  efforts,  summoned  and  shaped.
Diplomatic situations, in this way, assume a causal relationship between scales such
that an exchange or insult around a table will be converted and magnified in the world.
24 It’s worth underlining that political entities are not made manifest only by humans, but
also in objects. This is the case of the feminine statuette examined by MARION BERTIN. Its
role  as  object-ambassador,  a  notion  coined  by  Jean-Marie  Tjibaou  in  the  1980s,  is
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conferred de facto by its presence in metropolitan collections. Far from demanding the
return of artefacts, as other minority or formerly colonised nations have done, New
Caledonian people have decided since the 1990s to leave their heritage abroad in an
explicit strategy of cultural diplomacy. In a very different context, by reconstructing
the  process  of  fabricating  a  ninth-century  Mamelouk  diplomatic  document,  RÉMI
DEWIÈRE demonstrates that the letter itself was treated as the body of the Sultan, and
thus  assumed  the  role  of  representative  on  an  equal  footing  with  emissaries  and
diplomatic gifts.
25 A causal relationship between the model and its referent, often desired, is not always
achieved.  In  such  cases  diplomacy  takes  on  a  decidedly  utopian  character.  Sophie
Houdart (2013) describes the Japanese world fair of 2005, which aimed at a classically
Western universalism, of the UN type (national pavilions arranged within a perimeter),
and simultaneously to universalise a properly Japanese, intimate relation between the
subject  and  nature,  described  by  the  concept  Satoyama.  Unfortunately,  the  fair’s
realisation entailed felling a forest, a hypocrisy that generated conflicts and tensions.
In  a  similarly  utopian  register,  the  rich  philanthropist  Albert  Kahn  launched  a
Planetary Archives project at the start of the twentieth century. It was a vast collection
of monochrome photographs from the four corners of  the earth taken by specially
trained operators. When Kahn received the great and good of the world at his house in
Boulogne, he would show the collection before leading a visit to his world-garden, in
which different landscaping traditions were reproduced, their harmonious assemblage
representing the world as it should be. His friend Henri Bergson remarked upon the
influence Kahn enjoyed, thanks to these grandiose displays, during the construction of
the League of Nations. But Kahn’s world-garden could not prevent the eruption of the
Second World War.
26 Another  example  of  this  idea  of  modelling  comes  from  a  different  context  to  this
familiar one of negotiations between states at world summits and the like, namely the
Central Brazilian Enawenê-nawê. Yankwa, a ritual that lasts several months, repeatedly
divides the polity into opposing categories in order to put them into relation and, by
this means, negotiate more encompassing oppositions. In the open sandy arena of their
circular village,  Enawenê people behave as though they were other to one another,
making  estrangement  a  positive  basis  for  relationship.  Their  dyadic,  face-to-face
encounters are always a cypher for larger categories and cosmological positions. It is
not as brothers-in-law, romantic adversaries or allies that men face one another in the
arena but as host and dancer, cultivator and fisherman, living and dead, human and
spirit. In this ritual role play, which condenses many identities, a person becomes other
to  himself  as  well  as  to  his  opposite  number.  Like  the  diplomat  abroad  who  is
empowered to speak for his country, he is a pure representative—”Norway is of the
opinion …” (Neumann 2012). Similarly, once Enawenê people enter the public arena,
formality, estrangement and self-reflexivity give relationships a markedly diplomatic
character:  speech  and  gesture  are  measured  and  stylised,  while  movement  is
choreographed as people signal respectful interpersonal alignment using predictable
gestural  and  postural  codes.  Unlike  a  president,  whose  “personal  diplomacy”  is
efficacious when it draws on the resources of sincerity, the diplomat’s is a detached,
collectivised voice. This is the condition for, and the sign of, a person’s elevation to the
rank of diplomatic representative for larger forces.
Anthropology and diplomacy
Terrain, 73 | 2020
10
27 It is intriguing that circular space seems to be an essential support to what we call
miniaturisation, both for Enawenê diplomacy (Nahum-Claudel 2018: Chap. 4) and for
national  and  international  politics.  If  we  look  at  the  architectures  of  the  flagship
institutions of international communities of sovereign states—the EU, the UN, Olympic
stadia or the circular meeting table that is ubiquitous in peace talks—all replicate the
circular  form  of  parliaments  found  around  the  globe  and  echo  a  hegemonic
civilizational history with roots in the ancient world (the political mythology of the
Greek agora). Michael Suk-Young Chwe (1998) convincingly shows how the circle, often
mobilised by a presiding authority, engenders public knowledge; knowledge that is not
only  shared  but  acknowledged  by  all  to  be  so.  Circular  space  emerges  thus  as  an
effective means of coordinating action. Circular space is also a prominent feature of
social  movements since the 1980s,  which are characterised by their reliance on the
architecture of the roundabout (Weizman et al. 2019). We can understand this reliance
on  conventionalised  spaces  as  a  means  not  only  of  assuring  diplomacy’s  public
character but also of mitigating its inherent uncertainty. Are concentric spaces not also
a necessary framework for diplomacy insofar as they are oriented to an empty centre,
enshrining an ideal of shared engagement in the construction of a common world, at
least in the order of interaction, if not in that of ontology? The aesthetic of the United
Nations is also that of a miniature of the universe, a space conceived for the mediation
of alterity that implies an idea of belonging and common responsibility. Roundabouts,
transformed into forums by the gilets jaunes, are also circular, but this time they scale
up to the universal not through a reduction of macro to micro but through a principle
of replication and networking—each roundabout is among thousands of others that are
the site of comparable debates.
28 The shared ubiquity  of  circles  in  Amazonia  and in  Europe  may nonetheless  hide  a
radical difference in the type of ritualism that is supported by circular space in each
case.  While  Amerindian  ritualism involves  condensation  (Houseman & Severi  1998),
that is, ritual action as defined by the simultaneous presence of contradictory relations,
Western politics resorts to a ceremonialism that mobilises a less complex, more
transparent,  symbolic  code.  Where  representatives  in  a  Javari  dynamically  combine
plural  identities,  they  are  at  once  partners  in  marriage  exchange,  enemies,  spirits,
dangerous animals, women and men; European ambassadors are content to efface their
own personhood and dress up in national costume. The public that is mobilised in these
circular arenas is also different. The Western political arena, inheritor of the res publica,
has a single purpose and meaning, whereas the Amazonian arena is typically the site of
translations and transformative relations. Here polarities are systematically inverted
and can simultaneously code very different kinds of relationship: man–woman,
shaman–patient, visitor–host, etc. (Hamberger 2012; Kelly Luciani 2017; Nahum-Claudel
2018).
29 With the contemporary globalisation of notions of culture and heritage,  Amazonian
rituals  have  acquired  a  diplomatic  function  in  countering  the  threats  arising  from
colonisation. Even rituals that do not necessarily model relationships with foreigners
may acquire an intrinsic political value based on their “traditional” character. In his
contribution, CYRIL MENTA describes such a role for the rituals of the Pankararu and their
neighbours in North-eastern Brazil.  Since the 1930s this  group,  who until  this  time
were considered caboclo,  a term implying a mixed Indigenous and colonial ancestry,
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began to display their praiá ritual as evidence of their Indigenous status, as a means to
attain territorial rights.
30 Far  from  being  peaceful,  praiá stages  a  war  against  the  occult  powers  that  cause
misfortune. It is not a diplomatic ritual in the sense that we’ve defined it but rather an
indirect weapon wielded by the Pankararu against large landowners who nibble away
at their lands. Brandished as an emblem for the benefit of state representatives, it has
been transformed into an image of threatened Indigeneity. Interestingly, the ritual’s
aesthetics owe much to the cangaceiros, highwaymen who waged a revolt against large
landowners in the region between the middle of the nineteenth and the start of the
twentieth century.
 
Mimicry and unsettled subjecthood
31 The institutionalisation of diplomacy seems to result in organisational and pragmatic
similarities  across  Amazonian  cases  and  international  diplomacy.  Looking  to  the
history of diplomacy between sovereign states, we find a story of replication. At the
end of the eighteenth century, states that had newly reified a division between the
“domestic” and “foreign” lined up to establish foreign ministries—Denmark in 1772,
Britain in 1782, France in 1789 (Neumann 2012: 48) until Ministries of Foreign Affairs
became “a  generally  acknowledged  accoutrement  of  statehood”  (2012:  48).  Kindred
institutional structures were replicated the world over as new foreign ministries were
set up drawing on institutional models provided by existing ones (particularly those of
more powerful nations). This replication of forms smoothed communication between
states because diplomats were easily able to identify their “opposite numbers” in other
countries  (2012:  51).  In  fact,  such  was  the  imperative  for  similarity  that  foreign
ministries became more like each other than like the central administrations of their
respective states. Through the cold war era, ministries around the world also grew in
step,  expanding their  personnel,  and today we are  in  a  phase  in  which diplomatic
practices and structures are copied by transnational corporations and NGOs, and towns
and regions, which, in the globalised world order, have sought to “diplomatize” (2012:
177–8).
32 In a similar fashion, participation in the game of interethnic relations in the Upper
Xingu assumes a common set of rules and apparatus: a circular village of adequate size
and  representatives  (chiefs  and  messengers)  who  master  another  village’s  customs
regarding the issuing of invitations. A common bodily aesthetic is equally important,
marking the successful incorporation of different peoples within the regional system.
Invitations to attend a festival, and the subsequent welcome, take the form of a ritual
dialogue in which each party speaks simultaneously and in their own language, even as
they  adopt  the  same  conventionalised  body  postures.  What  is  staged  is  thus  the
coexistence of linguistic untranslatability and a common pragmatics.
33 Mimicry and games of mirroring that identify one, at least momentarily, with one’s
interlocutor  also  exist  in  less  institutionalised  frameworks.  In  a  lively  portrait,  LÉO
MAGNIN breaks down the ways in which Stéphane attempts to settle disputes arising
between  neighbours  during  the  re-parcelling  of  agricultural  land  in  the  Auvergne
region of France. Stéphane’s delicate task is to prevent hedging trees from being felled.
This diplomat of the hedgerows is more successful in influencing the decisions of his
audience than an official representative of the State or of Nature would be in his place.
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Instead  of  adopting  the  distinguished  manners  of  a  career  diplomat,  through  his
clothing,  his  linguistic  register  and  other  implicit  signals,  Stéphane  cultivates  a
personable style similar to that of his public. He offers techniques for measuring wood
to estimate its  value,  distils  information from the policy rulebook and,  rather than
laying down the law,  puts  himself  in the shoes of  those inconvenienced by it.  And
finally, he doesn’t hesitate to bluff. In short, he experiments with his role to create
collusion and solidarity with his audience, offering different aspects of himself so that
everyone  finds  something  that appeals  to  them.  As  Olivier  Morin  (2011)  remarks,
imitation tends to signal a communicative intention, especially in the absence of shared
codes  and  beyond  the  transmission  of  informational  content.  This  is  the  case,  for
example, among children between the ages of 2 and 4 who imitate each other as they
play  side  by  side.  Imitation’s  communicative  function  is  explored  in  cinema,  for
example in the two scenes of extra-terrestrial encounter in Spielberg’s ET. ET and Elliot
touch  their  own  noses  in  turn,  and  then  each  other’s  fingers.  Similarly,  in  Close 
Encounters of the Third Kind, the Americans (logical ambassadors of humanity) exchange
a  sequence  of  musical  notes  and  coloured  lights  with  the  spaceship,  which  are
meaningless but interpretable because they can be imitated to become the index of a
Gricean communicative intention.9
34 Morin’s reminder of the value of mimicry applies not only to diplomacy. It is no doubt
an  inevitable  consequence  of  rubbing  shoulders  with  others.  Practices  of  inter-
mediation in the Americas of the sixteenth to eighteenth century present an extreme
version.  Left  among  Amerindians  to  serve  as  translators  for  later  commercial
exchanges (of pelts in North America, wood in Brazil), mediators tended to “go native”,
or at  least  to adopt an ambiguous,  double position.  Indeed,  as  a  liminal  figure,  the
diplomat always threatens to cross over to the other side. In our interview with Yves
Saint-Geours, he reveals that this problem is recognised within diplomacy. With the
importance of empathy and adopting the other’s perspective comes the risk that the
diplomat becomes “the host country’s ambassador to his own administration” rather
than the inverse. Frequent changes of posting required by the diplomatic service are
designed to avoid such “Stockholm Syndrome”. Thus, civil servants tend to fear that
which anthropologists by contrast actively seek out when they make a profession of
ensuring that their hosts’ voices and points of view are understood back home.
35 In all cases, diplomatic speech typically implies the substitution of the self for another
enunciator, typically the state. The stronger and more intrusive the latter, the more
the  speech  of  its  subjects  is  controlled  through  a  work  of  conformity  and  self-
censorship (Wang 2019). This totalitarian character makes of each citizen a more or less
consenting ambassador for its country’s power, as DI WU shows in his article about the
Chinese presence in Zambia.  Chinese citizens working in agriculture are confronted
with demands for interviews issued by African and European journalists who want to
know about the covert intentions of their country, whose foreign politics they perceive
as neo-colonial. In such situations, they are forced to improvise an ambassadorial role,
by repeating official discourse. Di Wu is interested in the stereotyped and ritualised
speech register  that  is  used in  such contexts  and which serves  to  affirm speakers’
allegiance to the Party in situations that are diplomatic in nature but are also just
potentially embarrassing moments in everyday life, to be negotiated with tact. Wu’s
text reveals the extent to which totalitarian regimes modify language, its grammar, its
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phrasing,  and also its  use.  The Party is  present in all  interactions:  one becomes its
ventriloquist, and, at the same time, one is always implicitly speaking to the Party.
 
The inventiveness of the vanquished
36 The idea of diplomacy as a creative modelling process allows us to envisage it as open,
experimental  and  continually  evolving.  Institutionalisation  comes  later,  after  some
trial and error often forced by unexpected historical circumstances. In this sense, a
position of weakness may be the driver of greater inventiveness. This was the case, for
example, in Italy during the Renaissance when small, regional states could not compete
on equal terms with the large European monarchies and so they invented a diplomacy
founded on rhetoric, religious authority and the bureaucracy of the Papacy (Ruggiero
2018).
37 In this issue, LIANA CHUA asks what kind of diplomacy will allow for the survival of a
Bornean village once its site has been flooded by the reservoir of a hydropower dam.
The majority of the village’s inhabitants accepted the government’s proposition and
relocated to a site nearer the road, that is, they agreed to be “civilised”. Others resisted,
founding a new dwelling place where material conditions and thus the survival of the
community  as  such  were  uncertain.  Through  a  combination  of  strategies,  each
requiring the performance of a different identity, the village not only survived but also
assured a position as an autonomous polity, capable of resisting the state’s demands.
38 Indigenous  peoples—a  term  that  signals  nothing  more  than  a  shared  history  of
dispossession, a loss of former sovereignty—are constrained to invent a new diplomacy
beyond that proper to the state. In this vein, there has been a progressive effort to lend
cultural content to a common political experience, and one of the ways this has been
achieved is through the concept of “mother-earth”. In their online contribution to this
issue,  JEAN  FOYER and  DAVID  DUMOULIN  KERVRAN analyse  the  self-definitions  that
Indigenous people mobilised at  the Paris  Climate Change Conference (COP21).  They
identify three themes in these narratives: the figure of the heroic, resilient victim; the
articulation of  traditional  and scientific  bodies  of  knowledge and the  insistence  on
their  symmetry;  and,  finally,  the  value  of  Indigenous  ecological  knowledge  for  its
intimate ties to interactions with “spiritual” or “supernatural” entities. By presenting
themselves  as  the  foremost  victims  of  global  warming  and  as  its  most  important
remedy, one of their goals is to guarantee or conquer territorial rights.
39 Yezidi  people  also  present  an  exemplary  case  of  the  diplomacy  of  the  vanquished.
ESTELLE  AMY  DE  LA  BRETÈQUE'S  contribution reveals the extent of  the gap between this
people and their public image which has been shaped by the massacres and abuses
committed against them by Islamic State. In this context, Nadia Murad, a young woman
from a minor religious lineage (a lineage of disciples), found herself propelled into the
role of international media representative. In a society that privileges men of leading
lineages, she was an unlikely candidate for the job. Adapting to the post-war situation,
Yezidis have invented a baptism to reintegrate women who have suffered rape and who
would previously, in this endogamous society, have been ostracised. Above all, finding
themselves displaced and living in new host countries, they are discovering the powers
of attraction and empathetic identification of their funeral laments. Having been rites
internal to their community, a means of granting victims a heroic martyrdom, these
laments have become a diplomatic weapon.
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40 In the light of these examples,  inventiveness clearly comes at a cost.  It  implies the
abandonment of part of what is held dear, the transformation of an image of the self to
satisfy foreign judgements—in sum, playing a part written by others. Happily, it is not a
given that the transformations wrought by diplomacy should be one- sided.
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NOTES
1. This was the title of a series of programmes presented by Florian Delorme on Radio
France Culture in October 2018.
2. This definition follows Hedley Bull (1977: 156), the founder of the English school of
international relations. His definition of diplomacy is three-fold: the peaceful conduct
of relations between states; meditated by ambassadors or emissaries, that is to say by
official  or  licensed representatives  (from  the  Greek  root  diplomâ,  a  clay  tablet  that
assured safe passage for its carrier); and in a ‘diplomatic’ style in the everyday sense of
the term, that is, combining tact, discretion and subtlety. 
3. Kwon,  17  October  2019,  the  3rd  Claude  Lévi-Strauss  conference  entitled
‘Anthropology and World Peace’.
4. Author in 1974 of Society Against the State, Clastres interpreted certain Amerindian
institutions and practices, especially the existence of chiefs lacking in coercive power,
as the means of preventing the emergence of states.
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5. Traditional  mixed-ancestry  (colonial  and Indigenous)  populations  who live  along
Brazil’s rivers, who have been recognised as Indigenous and have benefited from rights
conferred by that status since constitutional reforms of 1988.
6. The ontological  turn assembles a disparate set of  authors.  The senior generation
includes Wagner, Strathern, Descola, Viveiros de Castro and Latour, while the junior
one includes Pedersen and Holbraad. These authors are often in disagreement but have
all  approached  the  problem  of  authority  and  encompassment  in  anthropological
knowledge head on. The proposed solution consists for some in ignoring the concept of
representation altogether, which risks a return to an absolute relativism in which there
are as many worlds as there are visions of the world.
7. In Word and Object (1960), Quine proposed a thought-experiment designed to prove
that  translation  could  never  be  certain.  A  field  linguist  to  whom  an  informant
repeatedly designates a rabbit by saying ‘gavagai’ could never be sure that it designated
a rabbit rather than a ‘one-second rabbit stage’ or ‘the spatial whole of all rabbits’.
8. ‘Nos présidents sont parfaits’, Libération, 4 May 2018. 
9. Philosopher  of  language  Paul  Grice  transformed  the  way  of  conceptualising
communication and meaning by departing from the model of code in favour of a model
in which meaning is inferred. 
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